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BY PAUL F. ROTHSTEIN

Needed:
A Rewrite

Where the Federal Rules of
Evidence should be clarified

roposed far-reaching
changes in the Federal
Rules of Evidence are of
major practical significance to every lawyer involved in the criminal
justice process. The proposed
changes are contained in a recent
report by the American Bar Association Criminal Justice Section's
Rules of Criminal Procedure and
Evidence Committee. The report
was selected for publication in Federal Rules Decisions, 120 F.R.D. 299
(1988), because of its interest to
federal practioners and judges.
More than 40 judges, lawyers, and
scholars were involved in the fouryear study, and experts on each
particular rule acted as "reporters"
to the committee on those areas.
The report rewrites the rules on
such important matters as prior
convictions to impeach criminal
defendants, expert testimony,
character evidence, shielding rape
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victims, presumptions, child witnesses in violence and sex abuse
cases, jurors impugning their own
verdicts, competency, judicial notice, judicial comment, and admissibility of pleas, plea discussions,
and related statements.
The report, entitled Federal Rules
of Evidence: A Fresh Review & Evaluation, also makes a series of less
formal suggestions. These concern,
for example, general in limine procedures, the hearsay exception for
government records, and the hearsay exception for statements of future intention to show conduct of
others.
Additionally, the committee will
study problems concerning, among
other things, scientific evidence,
privileges, the coconspirator rule in
the light of recent Supreme Court
rulings, expert summaries and
charts in criminal cases, nonconvictions to impeach, other impeachment areas, habit evidence,

and in limine practice. This followup study is underway. Comments
are invited on both the work done
and the work yet to come.
Embodying a wealth of study and
interpretive materials, the report is
intended to be used as a resource
by state and federal judges, lawyers,
legislators, and commentators concerned with making, amending, inducing, or interpreting evidence
rules and rulings. Slightly more than
a decade has passed since evidence
codification (beginning with and
patterned on the Federal Rules of
Evidence) swept the country. Even
uncodified states use the Federal
Rules as exemplary. Lawmakers and
judges are ripe now to examineand are examining-whether in the
light of this intervening experience
the rules and their current interpretations are working as designed. For
example, among those following the
work of the committee has been the
U.S. Judicial Conference's Advisory
Committee on Criminal Rules, officially charged with initiating
amendments to the Federal Rules of
Evidence. So far the advisory committee has adopted the suggestion
to clarify the judge's discretion to
exclude convictions offered to impeach in civil and criminal cases,
which is expected to become law
shortly. Further, in May 1989 it
adopted the proposal for reasonable advance notice to a defendant
when uncharged crimes, wrongs, or
culpable acts are offered other than
for impeachment.
Matters in the Rules of Criminal
Procedure and Evidence Committee's report will, from time to time,
be recommended by the Criminal
Justice Section for further ABA action. This was recently done with the
proposal recommending that before evidence of other crimes may
be permitted pursuant to an exception to the ban on such evidence
other than for impeachment, the fact
that defendant committed the other
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crime must be proved to the judge
by clear and convincing evidence.
This is contrary to the U.S. Supreme
Court ruling in Huddleston v. U.S.,
- U.S. - (1988), which adopted the minority position among the
circuits requiring only evidence sufficient to support a finding. The ABA
House of Delegates adopted this
proposal as ABA policy in February
1989; their resolution calls on the
state and federal governments to
carefully reconsider the Huddleston
position in view of the risk of prejudice to the defendant. The U.S. Judicial Conference's Advisory Committee is currently considering the
proposal as well.

Convictions used to impeach
Impeachment of witnesses with
their prior convictions has always
been troublesome because of the
potential for prejudice, particularly
when the witness is a party. The
Federal Rules of Evidence added to
the confusion with a number of
ambiguities. The current rule (Rule
609) provides in part, "For purposes of attacking the credibility of a
witness, . . . a crime shall be ad-
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mitted ...if the crime (1) was punishable by death or imprisonment
.. in excess of one year ...and
[its] probative value outweighs its
prejudicial effect to the defendant
. .or (2) involved dishonesty or
false statement ... "
The report proposes that the
phrase "[crimes of] dishonesty and
false statement" (used to describe
one category of admissible convictions) be replaced by the phrase
"[crimes of] untruthfulness or falsification." This eliminates the
broad reach of a word like "dishonesty" (isn't theft dishonest? is a
narcotics dealer honest?) and confines the category to conduct having the most to do with witness
incredibility, such as perjury or
forging records. To avoid satellite
litigation, the statutory elements of
the crime must necessarily involve
untruthfulness or falsification.
The proposal also requires exclusion of any conviction found wanting upon a weighing of probative
value against prejudice. This determination must be articulated in detail in the record. Also corrected is
the ambiguity about what parties
(both sides?) to what kinds of suits
(criminal? civil?) can assert what kind
of prejudice (only to the case or to
other interests?) accruing to whom
(party? witness? society?). It is made
clear that all parties in all kinds of
cases may assert prejudice to
themselves, their cases, or their
witnesses.
The U.S. Judicial Conference's
Advisory Committee has moved to
clarify the ambiguity noted in the
report. Most recently, on May 22,
1989, the U.S. Supreme Court, majority and dissent, cited the report
approvingly on this matter in its
landmark decision on convictions,
Green v.Bock Laundry Machine Co.,
(1989). There have
U.S.
been numerous other approving
citations to the report as well.
Specific procedural safeguards
are also added by the report: Advance notice must be given of convictions that are going to be used;
details of a conviction ordinarily
must not be evidenced; and a list
of factors to consider in the weigh-

ing is provided. The impeachment
may take place during cross examination or at another time, and
if done by extrinsic evidence, the
public record is required unless
properly unavailable. There must
always be a fair opportunity to reply. There are provisions for convictions based on nolo pleas and for
verdicts of conviction that are not
yet solidified in a judgment. The
latter are made inadmissible.

Expert testimony
What criminal trial lawyer has not
been frustrated by an opposing expert witness who, during direct examination, orally dumps into the
record for the jury to hear, hearsay
statements of others, the contents
of inadmissible documents, and
loads of other inadmissible evidence, upon which the expert says
he "relied" in forming his opinion?
The expert may know the opposing
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lawyer hasn't heard this material
earlier and isn't prepared for it. For
all the opponent, court, and jury
know, it may be extremely unreliable.
The Federal Rules of Evidence
leave the door open for experts to
make this end run around hearsay
and other rules. Rule 703 provides
in relevant part that the "facts and
data" underlying expert opinions
need only be "of a type reasonably
relied upon by experts in the particular field .. " Reliance by an
expert is generally deemed to license admissibility. The opponent
has little opportunity to confront
underlying people and sources and
expose weaknesses. This may discourage cross examination altogether. In consequence, the jury
may be deceived into thinking a
weak opinion is unassailable. The
system (as well as the opponent) is
the loser.
The problem is exacerbated by
the fact that the Rules have lowered the qualifications required of
experts (Rule 702 requires only that
the expert have any "specialized
knowledge" from any skill or experience); eased restrictions on
when they may testify (i.e., whenever they would "assist the trier of
fact" in any degree, Rule 702); and
all but abandoned regulation of the
quality of the material upon which
they may rely (allowing hearsay and
other inadmissible evidence, Rule
703). The theory, questionable at
best, isthat all these matters can be
handled by the jury as a matter of
weight. The result is that the expert
testimony industry is burgeoning.
Paul F.Rothstein isa professor of law
at Georgetown University Law Center and a member of the Criminal
Justice Council. He was chairperson
of the Rules of Criminal Procedure
and Evidence Committee during the
four-year study reported here and is
continuing as chairperson of a follow-up study, which solicits your
comments. The full study appeared
in Federal Rules Decisions, 120
F.R.D. 299 (1988). It may be purchased from the Section offices.
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Hardly a trial goes by without at
least one and probably more hired
experts, frequently of marginal expertise, presenting opinions based
on hidden foundations of sand, yet
deeply affecting the jury.
The report proposes restrictions
(with exceptions) on the admissibility of an expert's basis material
that is not independently admissible. The committee is also considering other reforms in the area of
expert testimony.

Character evidence
Rule 404(b) currently provides
that "evidence of other crimes,
wrongs, or acts is not admissible to
prove character to show an act in
conformity therewith [but] may be
admissible for other purposes such
as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge,
identity, or absence of mistake or
accident." The central dilemma in
the area of character evidence has
been the unworkable distinction
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between evidence of other crimes,
wrongs, or acts offered for the socalled prohibited purpose ("to
prove character in order to prove
an act in conformity with the character") and such evidence offered
for a permissible purpose (to prove
"plan" or "systematic course of
conduct," "identity," "motive,"
"intent," "preparation," "knowledge," "absence of mistake or accident," etc.). In many cases, both
theories of offer amount to the
same thing-there is no real distinction. This puts the judge in the
position of making an unprincipled
choice and deprives attorneys of
the predictability necessary for
planning. Irreconcilable decisions
abound.
The problem is that both theories involve "propensity" reasoning. This reasoning says that
because a person did something
before (or did it a certain way, or
with certain intent), he is more likely to have done it again-he has a
propensity for it and has probably
acted in accord with that propen-
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sity. This "propensity" reasoning in
many cases constitutes, at the same
time, both an impermissible purpose ("character to prove act in accord") and a permissible purpose
(e.g., a "plan" in the sense that both
crimes proceeded in accord with
the same blueprint or modus operandi even if not planned together).
Instead of this vaguely differentiated bifurcation of purposes, the
report proposes a more defined and
workable bifurcation. It distinguishes
between propensities that, because
they involve moral connotations and
are very general or diffuse, can properly be called "character," and other
propensities that, while still being
propensities, do not meet these
character criteria. The former propensities should be prohibited because they are morally charged and
not very probative.
The terminology of "motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,
knowledge, identity, or absence of
mistake or accident" used in the
current Federal Rule to describe the
permissible purposes is abandoned. The current string of permissible purposes is frequently
chanted in its entirety, unbroken,
by attorneys and courts as a magic
talisman to justify receipt of evidence without analysis, and without particular catchwords in the
phrase being tied to any of the evidence in any meaningful way.
The new rule should produce results more in accord with the intention of the present rule and the
common law: If a broad-based attack on the type of person is the
aim, the evidence should be excluded; but if some pattern truly
more probative or less morally
charged than that is involved, the
evidence should be viewed more
favorably. The result will be felt
principally by those judges who
have admitted uncharged-crimes
evidence with extreme liberality.
Crimes, wrongs, or culpable acts
offered pursuant to the revised
permissible purposes must be preceded by reasonable advance notice to the other side, and must be
shown to have probative value out-
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weighing negative factors such as
prejudice, confusion, misleadingness, and time consumption. When
the evidence is to be used against
a criminal defendant, the probative
value must substantially outweigh.
The proposal reverses U.S. v. Huddleston, - U.S. -(1988),
by
prescribing that the prosecution
must demonstrate by clear and
convincing evidence (not merely
evidence sufficient to support a
finding, as in Huddleston) that the
accused committed the act. The
proposal for reasonable notice was
adopted on May 18, 1989, by the
U.S. Judicial Conference's Advisory Committee on Criminal Rules,
for inclusion in amendments to the
Federal Rules of Evidence. The
proposal concerning Huddleston,
requiring clear and convincing evidence, became ABA policy by act
of the House of Delegates in February 1989.
Another character rule, Rule
404(a), governs the accused's right
to show his own good character.
Currently, the word "pertinent"
limits the kind of good character
trait that the accused may introduce in his own behalf. This word
has proved to be ambiguous. The
committee eliminates it, since its
intended function-to indicate, for
example, that ordinarily a trait for
nonviolence may be shown in an
assault but not an embezzlement
case-is performed anyway, to the
extent appropriate, by the generally applicable concepts of relevance, prejudice, misleadingness,
time, and the like.
The committee expressly requires a good faith basis for crossexamination questions about specific instances designed to discredit
a character witness.
The prosecution may offer evidence of the character of a non-sexcrime victim in any kind of criminal
case only if the defense does so
first. This eliminates a special,
broader prosecution license in
homicide cases accorded by the
current rule. Character evidence is
expressly prohibited in civil cases.
The committee proposal also
deals with expert testimony about

I1

IIH

character, and mental or personality traits, features, or illnesses
which, under current law, seem to
be in an uncertain limbo, to be
classed as character or not according to the whim of the particular
judge and the perspicacity of the
lawyers, if the issue is recognized
at The
all. committee
also addresses
other problems in the character
area. In this section of the Rules
(Rules 404 and 405, among others),
the drafting is singularly murky,
glossing over poorly conceived and
poorly delineated concepts. This is
not in keeping with the careful work
of the drafters in many other areas.
This murkiness has deprived lawyers and judges of needed signposts, has promoted widespread
misunderstanding of the rules, has
resulted in tremendous disparity
among rulings, and has joined with
the propensity difficulty already
noted to make this one of the most
litigated areas in caselaw annals.
Drafting snafus include mixing
apples and oranges in the same
rule; occasionally unpredictably
segregating them; and, in some
rules, doing both in different portions. Rules that form exceptions to
other rules are not noted or crossreferenced. The proposals address
these problems.

Rape shield
Federal Rule of Evidence 412 provides in rape cases that "past sexual
behavior of [the] victim ... is not

admissible [except that] evidence
other than reputation or opinion
[may be admitted if] constitutionally
required or... offered [to show alternative source of] semen or injury
[or] concern." The rule has a laudible objective: shielding victims of
rape and attempted rape from unwarranted character assassination.
The committee found, however,
that almost everyone acquainted
with the rule agreed that it isa blunt
instrument and a drafting disaster.
It was prepared hastily in Congress
as an expedient, well after and
(Continued on page 44)
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without the careful work that went
into the other Rules.
In trials for sex offenses, indiscriminate introduction of the sexual character and conduct of the
victim can be a serious problem.
This evidence, often of marginal
relevance, can effectively rape the
victim a second time in court, discourage other genuine rape complaints, dampen future victims'
willingness to cooperate with authorities or testify, and infringe privacy.
There is, however, a dilemma
here. To the extent that the defendant is protected by a broad view
of the relevance of such evidence,
the interests of the victim and society suffer. But the reverse is also
true: Serving these interests can and
often does impinge upon the defendant's defense, something in
which society may also share an interest.
Setting policy regarding evidence of this kind requires careful
study, thought, and drafting. The
task should not be left to the vagaries of constitutional adjudication. Policy should be ascertained
within the constitutional limits, and
the rule should provide concrete
guidance to participants in the system. How the rule interplays with
other rules affecting the evidence
should also be specified. Terminology should be clear.
Current Rule 412 falls short in
most of these respects; the report
proposes entirely new language.
This new language extends coverage to victims of all sex crimes; provides a broad, clear-cut, comprehensive ban; and then states clearly
expressed exceptions (based on a
study of cases around the country)
that attempt to balance competing
considerations and to treat similar
situations alike. The exceptions include, in appropriate circumstances, sexual conduct with the accused to prove consent, certain
patterns of conduct, conduct that
is part of the alleged offense, conduct to show an alternative source
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for enumerated telltale signs of the
offense, impeachment, specific
motive to lie, and certain material
offered in connection with expert
testimony.
Presumptions in criminal cases
This subject has forever mystified
lawyers and judges. The drafters of
the Federal Rules of Evidence gave
up in despair and left this area with
no codified rule. The excuse was
that the problem was too knotty and
should await codification in the then
pending congressional criminal code
revision. However, no provision
ever emerged from that criminal
code effort.
The committee believes that the
reasons that make general codification of Rules of Evidence desirable apply in force to the important
but obscure area of criminal presumptions. The source of the problem with both civil and criminal
presumptions has been the law's
failure to recognize and treat separately the many entirely disparate
questions in a trial that an enacted
or judicially created "presumption" answers. For example, questions may arise as to whether, when
there is evidence of 'X" and "y"
must be proved by a party, there
should be a directed verdict because "x" does not sufficiently suggest "y." Isjudicial comment to the
jury appropriate, to the effect that
"y" may be found from "x"? When
"x" is introduced, may the jury be
instructed that the burden of persuasion on "y" has now shifted to
the opponent of "y"? Does establishing "x" remove "y" from the
case as a subject for proof? A presumption seems to provide an answer to all of these questions, but
they should not be lumped together.
The committee leaves to statutory and case law the matter of what
particular presumptions exist. The
proposal provides, however, that
unless a contrary intention specifi-

cally emerges, statutory language
creating a presumption of "y" from
"x" (or employing equivalent language) has the effect of determining only one question: whether "x"
is sufficient evidence of "y" to
compel the judge to present the issue of "y" to the jury.
For example, if there is a statutory presumption that a person who
is found present at an unlicensed
distillery has something to do with
the distillery's operation (operation
being the crime), assuming such
presumption is constitutional, there
is only one effect: The judge would
know that if the prosecution has
evidence of presence but no evidence of operation, the case must
still be submitted to the jury. The
jury, however, would be told nothing other than what they would
normally be told in the absence of
any such presumption. Similarly, a
presumption concerning a defense
would let the judge know that the
jury must expressly be given the
option to embrace the defense
even if the judge felt the fact proved
could not make out the defense.
Another proposal codifies current federal law on the judge's
qualified power to make an advisory, accurate, impartial evidence
summary, or comment on the
weight of the evidence, at the close
of all the evidence and argument.
Banned, however, is the use of any
presumption terminology with the
jury, even when a presumption's
intended effect is to produce judicial comment to the jury. The committee found that presumption
language is bewildering to juries
and produces irrational results out
of keeping with both the intent of
the jury and the intent of the presumption. The proposal mandates
that in this situation, the basis of the
inference be explained instead.
Believing that much of the problem with presumptions stems from
misunderstanding of the meaning
of key terms in the law of proofterms such as "burden of persuasion," "burden of production,"
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"element of offense," "defense,"
and the like-the proposal provides a clear general definition of
these terms not intended to change
the law.

Child witnesses
Many jurisdictions are codifying
(or adopting by decision) relaxations of traditional party-protecting
safeguards when child witnesses
are involved, principally where the
child is the alleged victim of the sex
abuse or violence charged in the
case. This approach takes two
forms: (1) hearsay exceptions
(either new ones or judicial stretching of old ones) to allow into evidence the child's statements to
police, parents, relatives, or babysitters; and/or (2) courtroom procedures for sheltered testimony
(the screen between defendant and
the thirteen-year-old victim witnesses in Coy v. Iowa, U.S. (1988)). These provisions and rulings use varying degrees of care to
accommodate the competing interests of, on the one hand, the defendant in defending and, on the
other, the victim in avoiding psychological trauma and the state in
preventing false retractions.
The movement toward protection of the victim and the state's
case seemed to the committee to
express a perceived need that, if
unaddressed or left to quick political "fixes," might result in some
very poor solutions in which the
cure was worse than the disease.
Against this background, the committee tackled the problem with the
Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws.
The proposal creates a special
hearsay exception allowing into
evidence a videotaped statement
of the child, provided certain rigorous safeguards are observed in
making and in offering the videotape, but only if it is determined that
live testimony would produce severe emotional or psychological
disturbance in the particular child.
In a criminal case, the court must,
if requested, call the child for further trial questioning by the oppo-
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nent; the court may do so in civil

cases. In any case where the child
isto be called as a witness (whether
the hearsay exception has been
utilized or not), if the judge finds
that traditional testimony would
produce severe emotional or psychological disturbance in the particular child, the testimony may be
given in a somewhat "sheltered"
fashion, perhaps through a two-way
video hook-up with the child in
another room than the courtroom. Because of the necessity of
a particularized finding of severe
emotional or psychological disturbance, the option to the judge
to allow two-way video, and the
non-incriminating nature of and
better visibility of video as compared with a shielding screen, the
proposal should withstand attack
under Coy. (Coy invalidated, pursuant to the U.S. constitutional
confrontation clause, a one-way
screen shielding the defendant
from the view of the children, but
allowing him and the jury to dimly
see the children.) This conclusion
is bolstered by several post-Coy
decisions.
Miscellaneous revisions:
pleas, jury improprieties,
judicial notice
The report extends the inadmissibility currently accorded to plea
bargain discussions with prosecuting attorneys, to include such discussions with other law enforcement officers if they have authority
to enter into such discussions or if
they affirmatively lead defendant to
believe they have it.
In order to overturn a jury verdict, current law will not receive,
with a few exceptions, the testimony or affidavit of a member of
that jury attesting to improprieties
in or affecting the jury. The committee proposes that violence
among jurors directed at producing
a certain verdict be listed among
the exceptions. The committee is
considering whether juror drug and
alcohol intoxication, at least if pervasive, ought also to be excepted,
contrary to Tanner v. United States,
103 S. Ct. 2739 (1987).

Currently, judicial notice of any
relatively indisputable fact in a civil
or criminal case may be taken at any
stage, including trial and appeal.
However, judicial notice on appeal
in a criminal case conflicts with another part of the judicial notice rule,
which provides that in a criminal
case the jury must be given a
chance to find for or against the fact
judicially noticed. If a fact is judicially noticed for the first time on
appeal, the jury will not have been
given a chance to reject it.
Courts have been giving precedence to the provision that says judicial notice may be taken on appeal, and "winking" at the notion
that this deprives the jury of the
chance to reject the fact. This is
done particularly (but not exclusively) in cases where the fact is essential to convict, was inadvertently omitted by the prosecution
below, and is a technical matter of
federal jurisdiction (for example,
that Fort Leavenworth is within U.S.
territorial jurisdiction, or that South
Central Bell Telephone Co. is a facility for transmission of interstate
communications). Courts fear that
any other view would "let a criminal go on a technicality," since he
normally cannot be retried because of double jeopardy.
The courts use a variety of ruses
to get around the rule provision.
The underlying excuse seems to be
that because the fact is judicially
noticeable, it is ex hypothesi beyond rational dispute, and therefore the jury would find it to exist
anyway. The jury should not be
given freedom to act irrationally by
finding that it does not exist.
The committee believes that as a
general matter in a criminal case
where there is a jury trial, the jury
should have a chance to accept or
reject even facts judicially noticed,
and should be so instructed. The
committee proposal prohibits judicial notice at any stage after the
commencement of jury deliberation. There are two exceptions:
One concerns the type of jurisdictional situation mentioned above;
the other is intended to embrace
situations where judicial notice is
taken of a scientific truism about the
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chemical or structural nature of a
substance, e.g., that cocaine hydrochloride is a derivative of coca
leaves. Judicial notice should be allowed to be taken at any stage of
the proceedings in these two situations, to avoid the kind of hypertechnical results that bring the law
into disrepute.
Since 1975, when the Federal

Assigned

Rules of Evidence became effective, an overwhelming majority of
states have adopted rules patterned on them, and the remaining
states have frequently cited them
as being highly influential in evidence decisions. The Criminal Justice Section's Rules of Criminal
Procedure and Evidence Committee studied the accumulated federal and state experience under the
rules in anticipation of the interest
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which is now being shown on the
state and federal levels in seeing
whether the rules are working or
need changing or modified interpretations in the light of 10 years of
experience. The Committee's report is a valuable resource for any
such re-examination and also for
courts and lawyers who must be
concerned with the soundness of
evidentiary rulings and interpretaC)
tions on the front lines.
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(Continued from page 19)
portant that the program be autonomous and effectively independent
of management or ministerial control of the judiciary-or any other
governmental branch with conflicting objectives or interests, either real
or perceived.
Typical confrontations between
the courts and assigned counsel
programs involve the authority to
assign or remove attorneys and to
approve or disapprove payment of
attorneys' bills. However it is structured, a program should retain the
ultimate authority to assign attorneys, in order to prevent judges
from hand-picking attorneys who
may meet the needs of the court
rather than the needs of their
clients. It also is important that the
payment of attorneys' fees be determined and approved by the program, independent of the courts'
control. A perhaps apocryphal exchange illustrates the advantages of
an independently administered
program. Following her aggressive
and vigorous representation of a
client, an assigned attorney was told
at sidebar by the judge that he not
only would not appoint her again,
he would not pay her for the case
at hand. Because of the structure of
the system, the attorney was able
to say, "It doesn't work that way
any more, Your Honor."
If courts have a financial interest
and administrative authority over
the program, this may conflict with
and undermine the effectiveness of
representation. Similarly, direct in-
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volvement of judges in assignment
and payment of counsel may potentially interfere with attorneys'
exercise of independent professional judgment in handling their
cases.
While many courts jealously
guard what they believe to be their
prerogatives in this area, mounting
funding problems and administrative headaches have caused some
courts to yield these responsibilities, perhaps on a piecemeal basis,
to other agencies. If properly presented, legislation that clearly establishes authority outside the
courts to select, train, pay, evaluate, remove, and support attorneys
could provide welcome relief from
overwhelming judicial responsibility. (See, e.g., Massachusetts General Laws c.21 1D.) It is also less
likely to meet resistance as other
problems faced by the judiciary escalate.

Standards and evaluation
Because criminal law is a complex specialty that requires keen
trial advocacy skills and up-to-date
expertise on constantly changing
case law, bar membership should
not automatically entitle an attorney to be a member of the panel
of attorneys eligible to accept assignments and compensation. This
must be a basic tenet of any assigned counsel program. If an assigned counsel program is to

provide quality representation, it
must have the authority to:
" Set threshold qualifications for
members of the panel of participating attorneys and establish
performance standards for continuing eligibility on the panel;
• Monitor and evaluate the performance of panel members;
and
• Remove panel members.
Qualification standards. Qualification standards are criteria by
which prospective participants in
the assigned counsel program can
be evaluated prior to acceptance on
a panel. The standards are used to
ensure that only qualified, trained
attorneys with criminal law experience and trial advocacy skills will
represent indigent defendants. The
program should establish and
maintain a number of different
panels, each with a set of qualification standards tailored to the severity of the charges. A policy of
general eligibility for any and all
types of assignments, based on
passing the bar examination or taking a training course, fails to recognize the danger of permitting
inexperienced counsel to hone
their advocacy skills at the risk of
jeopardizing their clients' rights. Ad
hoc assignments by judges may reflect a sensitivity to the experience
and competence of counsel and the
type of case. This should not, however, be a substitute for clearly
written objective standards estab-
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